Scope
A workshop
about catastrophic events related to cryptography
and security. And their prevention, detection,
recovery, solutions ...
The main point is: many cryptographic protocols
are only based on the security of one
cryptographic algorithm (e.g. RSA) and we
don't know the exact RSA security (including Ron
Rivest). What if somebody finds a clever and
fast factoring algorithm? Well, it is indeed an
hypothesis but we know several instances of
possible progress. A new fast algorithm is a
possible catastroph if not handled
properly. And there are other problems with hash
functions, elliptic curves, aso. Think also about
the recent Heartbleed bug (April 2014, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed): the discovery was very late and
we were close to a catastrophic situation.
So we are thinking about a regular workshop, the
name is cataCRYPT, about these possible problems
and their solutions. It includes problems with
cryptographic algorithms, protocols, PKI, DRM,
TLSSSL, smart cards, RSA dongles, MIFARE, aso. Quantum
computing, resilience and agility are also on the
program.
The workshop aims at bringing together researchers
and practitioners working in cryptography and
security, from academia and industry. A large
committee including many founders of the main
concepts of publickey cryptography is pushing
this important topic.
Format
The
workshop will consist of invited and keynote
presentations, full papers, informal
contributions, panels, research in progress and discussions.
Keynote Speakers
Whitfield Diffie
When Is a Catastrophe Really a Catastrophe?
The first step in planning for catastrophes is to explore how
do catastrophes differ from a less than catastrophic setbacks,
adverse events, or disappointment? A true catastrophe can
no be totally mitigated; the world after the catastrophe looks
different from the world before but may not be worse from the
view of every participant
Martin E. Hellman (Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University)
Prolonging the Life of Public Key Cryptography
This talk argues
that prudence would require public key cryptography to use much larger
key sizes than are typically used. It also shows how seemingly
unforeseen advances in factoring and discrete logs might be forseeable.
It then examines what we might do to ensure a higher level of security,
and why barriers to achieving more robust security may be more
psychological than technical
Invited talk
Nancy Leveson (MIT)
Protecting Against Broken Cryptography through Systems Thinking
Final panel
Peter G. Neumann (SRI, comp.risks) and others
Risks of CataCryptic Event
Organization
The
workshop chair is JeanJacques Quisquater
(UCLouvain, LouvainlaNeuve, Belgium)
